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Abstract
Prosocial behavior, which means paying a cost for others to receive a benefit, is encountered in the
donation game, the prisoner’s dilemma, relaxed social dilemmas, and public goods games. Many stud-
ies of prosociality assume that the population structure is either homogeneous, meaning all individuals
have the same number of interaction partners, or that the social good is of one particular type. Here, we
study general evolutionary dynamics for arbitrary kinds of social goods. We find that heterogeneous
population structures, where some individuals have many more interaction partners than others, are
extremely conducive for the evolution of prosocial behaviors. Furthermore, prosocial behaviors can
evolve that accumulate most of the benefit in a few highly connected nodes while many peripheral
nodes receive low or negative payoff. Surprisingly, prosociality can evolve even if the total costs exceed
the total benefits. Therefore, the highly heterogeneous interaction structure of human society, which
is augmented by the internet, strongly promotes the emergence of prosocial behaviors but also creates
the possibility of generating tremendous inequality.
The typical setting to study prosocial behavior is in two-player or in multi-player games. In the
first case, we encounter the donation game [1, 2], prisoners dilemma [3–8], or relaxed social dilemmas
[9–11]. In the second case, we are in the world of public goods games [12–17]. In both cases, it is usually
assumed that players are in identical positions and affect all others equally. Here, we consider social
goods dilemmas, in which individuals may pay a cost to produce a good that benefits their neighbors.
Unlike many previous studies, which consider a specific kind of social good [18, 19], the distribution
of benefits and costs depend on the population structure and on the nature of the good itself. If some
individuals are central and widely connected within a group while others are peripheral, social goods
dilemmas lead to heterogeneous game structures with surprising evolutionary dynamics.
An interaction structure is homogeneous if each individual interacts with the same number of other
individuals; these structures are represented by homogeneous (or regular) graphs [20–23]. A structure
is heterogeneous if individual interacts with different numbers of other individuals, as represented by
heterogeneous (or irregular) graphs [24–28]. The former are an important special case, the latter are
more general and more realistic.
Two questions become immediately apparent: (i) is the benefit of receiving the social good from a
specific donor independent of the number of recipients (non-rivalrous) or does it have to be divided by
the number of neighbors of the donor (rivalrous)? and (ii) is the cost of producing a prosocial good
proportional to the number of recipients or fixed? In the traditional setting of homogeneous games,
there is no reason to consider these cases separately since the differences between them amount to a
simple rescaling of benefits and/or costs (Figure 1).
In a heterogeneous society, however, it is necessary to distinguish between those different kinds of
social goods. The total benefit of the good could be proportional to the number of recipients or fixed.
We label these cases “p” and “f.” The production of the good could entail a cost which is proportional
to the number of recipients or fixed. Again we label these cases “p” and “f.” Thus, we have four types
of social goods representing the combinations: pp, pf, fp, ff. In the main text, we focus on two of those
four cases, pp and ff, since they show the whole range of interesting phenomena. The two other cases,
pf and fp, are discussed in the SI where we also explore general functional dependencies, asymmetric
cases, and stochastic payoffs.
For a pp-good, the producer pays total cost, ck, and the total benefit bk is split among the k neighbors;
thus each neighbor receives b. For an ff-good, the producer pays cost, c, and the total benefit b is split
among the k neighbors; thus each neighbor receives b/k. The behavior is prosocial if both b and c are
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Figure 1: Prosocial behaviors with proportional (pp) and fixed (ff) benefits and costs. a, For pp-goods, a producer
pays cost c for each neighbor to receive benefit b. For ff-goods, a producer pays a fixed cost c irrespective of the
number of neighbors, k; each neighbor receives benefit b/k. b, On a regular graph, such as a two-dimensional
grid, all individuals have the same number of neighbors; here k = 4. For pp-goods, each individual receives payoff
4(b− c). For ff-goods, each individual receives payoff b− c. Therefore, on regular graphs the payoffs arising for
pp and ff goods are equivalent up to rescaling. c, On heterogeneous population structures, such as the star, the
two social goods lead to distinct payoff distributions, and one cannot be obtained by rescaling the other. Therefore
heterogeneous graphs differentiate between pp and ff goods.
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positive, which we assume throughout. However, we make no apriori assumption regarding the ranking
of b and c.
The interaction structure of the game is given by a graph or by a social network. The individuals
occupy nodes. The links specify interactions between individuals. Each individual can choose between
two strategies: producer and non-producer. A producer generates the social good as specified above. In
contrast, a non-producer provides no benefits and incurs no costs.
The first question that needs to be explored is: when is a prosocial behavior wealth producing? A
natural measure for total wealth is simply the sum over all benefits minus all costs assuming everyone
is a producer. Using this approach we find that the answer for both pp and ff-goods is easy: for any
graph the prosocial good is wealth producing if and only if b > c.
The second question concerns inequality and possible social harm. On a heterogeneous graph, it
is clear that even if everyone produces the social good, highly-connected individuals can accumulate
a much higher payoff than others. Depending on the graph structure, a small number of individuals
could hold the large majority of the wealth that is being produced. The poorest individuals can also
end up with negative payoffs (“harmful prosociality”). In this case, for the poorest it would be better
if no one engages in this kind of prosocial behavior. It also means there is no incentive for them to
participate, since the prosocial behavior is harmful for them, even when widely adopted. For pp-goods,
harmful prosociality can arise only if b < c. But for ff-goods it can arise even if b > c.
The third question is: under which conditions does the prosocial behavior evolve in a structured
population when behaviors are imitated based on payoff? We derive a surprisingly general result (Fig-
ure 2) that applies to almost any social good and update mechanism as long as some natural properties
hold. We find that producers are favored over non-producers under weak selection [29] if
N
∑
i=1
N
∑
j=1
vi
(
Pji −Qji
)
> 0. (1)
Here, vi is the fixation probability of a neutral trait starting in location i (the “reproductive value” [30] of
i). Pji is the expected probability that a producer in location j replaces a random individual in location
i, not in one particular state but rather averaged over a neutral distribution (see Methods). Qji is the
expected probability that a random individual in location j replaces a producer in location i. The double
sum is over all locations i and j, where N is the total population size. All quantities appearing in
Equation 1 can be obtained by solving systems of linear equations (see SI). This general condition is
made explicit for social goods in Equation 6 of Methods.
At first we focus on pairwise-comparison (PC) updating [5]: A random individual is chosen to
update its strategy. It compares its own payoff with that of a randomly chosen neighbor. If the neighbor
has a higher payoff, then the focal individual adopts the neighbor’s strategy (e.g. imitating the behavior
of a celebrity). If the neighbor has a lower payoff, then the focal individual remains with its current
strategy. The payoff comparison is subject to noise. Our analytical results are for the limit of large noise,
which is equivalent to the limit of weak selection. Using Equation 1, we find that producers are favored
over non-producers under PC updating if
N
∑
i=1
wi (Ui,0 −Ui,1) > 0. (2)
The parameter wi denotes the number of neighbors of individual i. Ui,0 is the expected payoff to a
producer in location i. Ui,1 is the expected payoff to a random individual who is a one-step neighbor of
the producer in location i. The sum is over all individuals i. Again the quantities Ui,0 and Ui,1 can be
calculated for any graph by solving systems of linear equations (see SI).
Using Equation 2, which holds for PC updating, we prove that prosocial behavior can never be
favored on homogeneous graphs. On heterogeneous graphs, it is possible that prosocial behavior evolves
if the benefit-to-cost ratio exceeds a critical value, which we denote by (b/c)∗. For pp-goods, we find
that (b/c)∗ can never be between zero and one, which means that b > c is a necessary condition for
producers to evolve. Thus, for pp-goods, prosocial behavior can evolve only if it is wealth producing.
Moreover, it can only evolve if it leads to a positive payoff even for the poorest individuals.
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Figure 2: Generic social goods and their selection condition. a,b Production of a social good by a producer, i, and
absorption by a neighbor, j. The act of producing the good incurs a total cost for i, of which Cij can be attributed to
neighbor j. The total benefit produced is distributed among the neighbors with j absorbing a benefit of Bij . c,d Pji
is the probability that j replaces i when j is a producer. Qji is the probability that j replaces i when i is a producer.
We prove that producers are favored over non-producers if and only if Pji > Qji on average. This inequality is
evaluated by averaging over all individuals, i, weighted by reproductive value, vi, see Eq. (2). This condition can be
easily evaluated for any social good, population structure, and update rule by solving a system of linear equations
(see SI).
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Surprisingly, though, for ff-goods (b/c)∗ can fall between zero and one (Figure 3). Thus, for ff-goods
prosocial behavior can evolve even it it is not wealth producing. It can also evolve if it leaves the poorest
individuals with a negative payoff (Figure 4). However, these results do not necessarily imply that the
outcomes for ff-goods are gloomy; rather, it simply demonstrates that the evolvabilty of producers alone
implies neither that wealth is produced nor that everyone is better off. By increasing the benefit-to-cost
ratio sufficiently beyond this critical threshold, we often find situations (see Supplementary Figures) in
which (i) producers of ff-goods evolve; (ii) everyone in the population is better off; and (iii) producers
of pp-goods with the same benefit-to-cost ratio cannot evolve.
For ff-goods it is the case that recipients have to divide the benefit, which makes the social good
“rival”. On the internet, many social goods can be modeled as “non-rival,” which means the benefit does
not have to be divided; each producer pays a cost of c to produce a good, and every neighbor receives
the full benefit of this good, b. In our notation, this case is captured by pf-goods. Just as for ff-goods,
selection can favor pf-goods even if b < c. However, we find that there are–statistically speaking–more
population structures on which ff-goods can evolve than pf- or pp-goods. Remarkably, we can prove
that a graph can support producers of pf-goods for sufficiently large b/c if and only if the same is true
for pp-goods. A similar pairing occurs between ff- and fp-goods. The reason for these results is that the
question of whether there exists some b, c > 0 for which selection favors producers depends on only the
benefit structure of the good (e.g. p or f); the cost structure influences the magnitude of (b/c)∗ but not
its sign (see SI).
We also study stochastic donations of social goods. Instead of either producing a social good for each
neighbor or dividing it up among the neighborhood, a producer might choose a single random neighbor
as the recipient of the good in its entirety. If the recipient is also a producer, then she chooses a random
neighbor to receive a good as well. But this neighbor could be different from the original producer, so
there is not necessarily any guarantee of reciprocation. We show that this stochastic donation scheme is
equivalent to ff-goods under weak selection (see SI); in particular, producers of such goods can evolve
even if b < c.
Using Equation 1, we also derive specific results for two additional update mechanisms: death-birth
(DB) and imitation (IM). Qualitatively, we find similar results; namely, that (i) there are structures on
which ff-goods or fp-goods can evolve when b < c and (ii) evolution can favor wealth-producing goods
that harm the poorest in the population. The primary differences between these update rules are in
the precise graphs on which prosocial behaviors are favored (see Supplementary Figures and SI). For
example, homogeneous graphs can promote prosocial behavior under DB and IM updating but not
under PC updating. Some heterogeneous structures can favor producers under one update rule but not
another. These differences are expected given that different update rules describe different evolutionary
dynamics. Our general result (Figure 2) is not restricted to any particular update rule and can be
adapted to many other situations.
In summary, we have shown that heterogeneous population structures act as strong promotors for
the evolution of prosocial behavior. Those interaction structures seem particularly pertinent in the digital
age and in the presence of the internet, where a single node could reach millions of followers. If the
production of the social good entails a fixed cost for the producer, which is independent of the number
of recipients, and yields a fixed total benefit, which is divided among recipients, then we can obtain
extremely low critical benefit-to-cost ratios; they can even be less than one. However, the resulting
prosocial behavior can lead to payoff distributions where a few highly-connected nodes accumulate
much of the total wealth [15], while poorly-connected nodes end up being harmed. These outcomes call
for the design of mechanisms to redistribute wealth in order to maintain a stable society, which engages
in and benefits from prosocial behavior.
Methods
Modeling evolutionary dynamics
We model a general evolutionary process in a population of finite size, N, using the notion of a replace-
ment rule [31, 32]. If the process is in state x at a given time step, then a replacement event (R, α) is
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Figure 3: Heterogeneous graphs allow efficient evolution of prosocial behavior. a, The “rich club” network
consists of a central clique of m well-connected individuals surrounded by n individuals at the periphery. Each of
the m “rich” individuals is connected to every other member of the population, but the n “poor” individuals are
only connected to the rich club. b, Payoffs to the two classes of individuals in the all-producer state. c, Critical
benefit-to-cost ratio needed for evolution to favor producers of the social good given PC updating. For pp-goods, the
critical benefit-to-cost ratio approaches 4m− 1 while for ff-goods, remarkably, it approaches 0. Therefore, producers
of ff-goods can evolve even if the total costs exceed the total benefits. d, Wealth held by the rich club in the all-
producer state normalized by total wealth. For pp-goods the rich club holds a constant proportion of the payoff. For
ff-goods the rich club can hold more than 100% of the payoff, because the poor individuals have negative payoff.
Explicit formulas for (b/c)∗ for any m and n in the SI.
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Figure 4: Evolution of prosocial behavior can result in widespread inequality. a, Prosocial inequality arising
in a coauthorship network of 379 scientists (see Methods). In the all-non-producer state, all individuals have the
same payoff. For each kind of donation, the critical benefit-to-cost ratio represents the threshold at which the
all-producer state is favored over the all-non-producer state (i.e. ρA > ρB). The payoffs in the all-producer state
are calculated for ff-goods when b = (b/c)∗ and c = 1. Relative to pp-goods, ff-goods have a lower barrier for
selection to favor producers ((b/c)∗ = 14.4558 for pp-goods and (b/c)∗ = 3.0139 for ff-goods), but it also results in
greater population-level wealth inequality. What is even more notable is that, for ff-goods, 59 out of 379 individuals
(depicted in green), or approximately 15.57% of the population, is worse off in the all-producer state than in the
all-non-producer state. b, This fraction decreases as the benefit-to-cost ratio increases. The benefit-to-cost ratio must
be at least (b/c)∗ = 34, which is much larger than (b/c)
∗ = 3.0139, for the all-producer state to be better for all
individuals in the population than the all-non-producer state. pp-goods, on the other hand, can evolve only when
b/c > 1, in which case all individuals are better off in the all-producer state. c, A smaller portion of the population
holds at least 50% of the wealth (depicted in red on the graph) for ff-goods than for pp-goods, further illustrating
how ff-goods can amplify wealth stratification.
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chosen with probability p(R,α) (x). A replacement event consists of a set of individuals to be replaced,
R ⊆ {1, . . . , N}, and a parentage map, α : R → {1, . . . , N}, where, for i ∈ R, α (i) = j indicates that
i is replaced by the offspring of j. The distribution
{
p(R,α) (x)
}
(R,α)
defines the replacement rule and
specifies the process driving evolution in the population.
For a fixed payoff scheme (e.g. proportional or fixed cost), the total payoff to i in state x is
ui (x) =
N
∑
j=1
(−xiCij + xjBji) , (3)
where Cij is the cost i pays to donate to j when i is a producer and Bji is the benefit j provides to
i when j is a producer. This payoff is converted to relative reproductive fecundity via the formula
Fi (x) = exp {δui (x)}, which is then used to determine the probability of choosing replacement event
(R, α) in state x. For example, under pairwise-comparison updating, this probability is
p(R,α) (x) =

1
N piα(i)
Fα(i)(x)
Fi(x)+Fα(i)(x)
R = {i} for some i ∈ {1, . . . , N} , α (i) 6= i,
1
N ∑
N
j=1 pij
Fi(x)
Fi(x)+Fj(x)
R = {i} for some i ∈ {1, . . . , N} , α (i) = i,
0 otherwise.
(4)
Fixation probabilities, transient dynamics, and the selection condition
We assume that there is at least one individual who can generate a lineage that takes over the population.
As a result, the population must eventually end up in one of the two monomorphic states, all-A or all-B.
Let ρiA (resp. ρ
i
B) be the probability that a single A (resp. B), placed initially at location i, takes over a
population of type B (resp. type A). The mean fixation probabilities for the two types are then
ρA =
1
N
N
∑
i=1
ρiA; (5a)
ρB =
1
N
N
∑
i=1
ρiB, (5b)
respectively.
By analyzing the demographic variables (e.g. birth rates and death probabilities) resulting from this
process, together with the transient dynamics (i.e. prior to absorption in all-A or all-B), we derive a
condition for ρA > ρB in the limit of weak selection (δ 1). Specifically, if (i) xij is the probability that i
and j have the same type in the neutral process; (ii) vi is the reproductive value of vertex i; and (iii) m
ij
k
is the marginal effect of k’s fitness on i replacing j, then ρA > ρB under weak selection if and only if
N
∑
i,j,k,`=1
vim
ji
k
(
−xjkCk` + xj`B`k
)
>
N
∑
i,j,k,`=1
vim
ji
k (−xikCk` + xi`B`k) . (6)
Moreover, this condition can be evaluated by solving a linear system of equations whose size is a
polynomial function of the population size, N. The details of this derivation may be found in the SI.
Under pairwise-comparison (PC) updating, we have ρA > ρB under weak selection if and only if
N
∑
i=1
pii
N
∑
`=1
(−xiiCi` + xi`B`i) >
N
∑
i,j=1
pii pij
N
∑
`=1
(
−xijCj` + xi`B`j
)
. (7)
8
Informally, this condition says that the expected payoff to a producer at i exceeds that of a random
neighbor. We can evaluate this expression by replacing xij by −τij, where τii = 0 for i = 1, . . . , N and
τij = 1+
1
2
N
∑
k=1
pikτkj +
1
2
N
∑
k=1
pjkτik (8)
whenever i 6= j. Finally, to see what Equation 7 looks like for a given kind of donation, we need only give
formulas for Bij and Cij. For pp-goods, we have Bij = wijb and Cij = wijc. For ff-goods, Bij = wijb/wi
and Cij = wijc/wi. Finally, for pf-goods, Bij = wijb and Ci = wijc/wi. In each case, Equation 7 can be
expressed as γb > βc, where both β and γ are independent of b and c, and β > 0. With b, c > 0, a
necessary condition for producers to be favored is thus γ > 0. Moreover, when γ > 0,
ρA > ρB ⇐⇒ bc >
(
b
c
)∗
=

∑Ni,j=1 wijwjτji
∑Ni,j,k=1 wij(wjk−wik)τki
pp,
∑Ni,j=1 wijτji
∑Ni,j,k=1 wij(pkj−pki)τki
ff,
∑Ni,j=1 wijτji
∑Ni,j,k=1 wij(wjk−wik)τki
pf.
(9)
On a homogeneous graph [33–35], one can show that γ < 0, which means that no homogeneous
structure can support the evolution of producers under PC updating. However, there are many examples
of heterogeneous graphs with γ > 0, which are outlined in the main text and the Supplementary Figures.
We also give further examples of (b/c)∗ under other update rules (e.g. DB, IM) in the SI.
Numerical examples
Figure 3 and Supplementary Figure 12 are both based on the “rich club” network of Fotouhi et al. [36].
Supplementary Figures 2 and 3 depict critical ratios on random graphs. Supplementary Figure 2
was generated using a Baraba´si-Albert preferential attachment model [37]; the population begins with
m0 = 2 individuals, and each new individual is connected to m = 1 existing members of the population
according to the standard degree-weighted distribution. Supplementary Figure 3a was generated using
the G (N, p) Erdo¨s-Re´nyi model [38]. Supplementary Figure 3b was created using the Watts-Strogatz
model [39] starting from a cycle (i.e. degree 2) and rewiring the edges based on β.
For all empirical networks considered here (which are available on public databases [40, 41]), we
have used the largest connected component to ensure that fixation is possible in the case of societies with
more than one connected component. The coauthorship network of Figure 4 is due to Newman [42]. The
sources of all other empirical networks in the Supplementary Figures are provided in the corresponding
captions.
In addition to randomly-generated and empirical networks, we also consider all 11,989,763 undi-
rected, unweighted graphs of size at most N = 10. Tables SI.1, SI.2, and SI.3 in the SI give the number
of graphs of each size on which producers can be favored over non-producers for some b, c > 0 (i.e.
γ > 0) under PC, DB, and IM updating, respectively, for four kinds of social goods (pp, pf, fp, and
ff). Supplementary Figure 9 provides further illustrations of the distribution of critical ratios on small
graphs.
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Supplementary Figure 1: Evolution of producers of ff-goods with 0 < b 6 c on the star. The star may be viewed
as a special case of the rich club, in which there is just a single “rich” individual (m = 1). a, invasion and fixation
of a mutant producer arising in a leaf under PC updating. This producer has a payoff of −c, and the non-producer
at the hub gets b. Through drift, this producer can take the hub and propagate a small portion of producers to the
leaves. Once there are k > c/b + 1/ (N − 1) producers at the periphery, a central producer’s payoff exceeds that of
everyone else in the population and selection favors the further spread of producers. b, invasion and fixation of a
mutant non-producer arising in a leaf. As soon as a non-producer captures the hub, selection favors the proliferation
of non-producers. However, when there is just a single non-producer in the population, a producer at the hub has
a much greater payoff than everyone else in the population (even when 0 < b 6 c). Thus, relative to the initial
invasion of a producer in a, selection acts much more strongly against the initial invasion of a non-producer in b.
For any fixed b, c > 0, these effects become strong enough as N grows that we find ρA > ρB.
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Supplementary Figure 2: Heterogeneous graphs allow efficient evolution of prosocial behavior. a, The distribu-
tion of the critical benefit-to-cost ratio for 106 preferential-attachment graphs of size N = 100 (see Methods). For
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Supplementary Figure 3: Evolution of producers can be possible for ff-goods but not for pp-goods. a, Erdo¨s-
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benefit-to-cost ratio is positive for both pp- and ff-goods, but for slightly larger p values this ratio can be positive
for ff-goods and negative for pp-goods. In the latter case, producers cannot evolve under any b/c ratio for pp-goods,
but they can evolve for ff-goods as long as b/c is sufficiently large. b, Small-world networks with different rewiring
probabilities, β. Again, there are many examples for which the critical benefit-to-cost ratio is positive for ff-goods
but negative for pp-goods. See Methods and SI for details.
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Supplementary Figure 4: Examples of critical benefit-to-cost ratios on real-world networks: the contiguous United
States, a; a group of Grevy’s zebras [43], b; Zachary’s karate club [44], c; and bottlenose dolphins [45], d. We say that
producers can be favored on a network if (b/c)∗ > 0. We show in SI that on any network, producers can be favored
for pp-goods (with some b, c > 0) if and only if they can be favored for pf-goods (with some, possibly different,
b, c > 0). Furthermore, when positive, the critical threshold for pf-goods is strictly less than that of pp-goods. On
the other hand, ff-goods can still be favored even when the other two cannot, as a illustrates. There are societies
in which producers cannot be favored for any of these three kinds of goods, e.g. b. Even when all three kinds of
goods can be favored, ff-goods can have a lower critical threshold than pf-goods and vice versa, as c and d show
(arrows indicate the lowest ratio). The threshold for pp-goods is higher than those of ff- and pf-goods, and there
are population structures on which some prosocial behaviors are favored while others are not.
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Supplementary Figure 5: Division of a society into two factions. Zachary’s karate club [44], a, and the subsequent
split of the karate club into two disjoint groups [46], b and c. Producers can evolve on all three networks only in
the case of ff-goods. Moreover, even for the two populations (a and b) in which both ff- and pf-goods can evolve,
this split swaps the rankings of the two. In particular, the critical ratio for pf-goods is lower in a but that of ff-goods
is lower in b. The threshold for all individuals to be better off in the all-A state than in the all-B state, (b/c)∗, is
lowered by the split.
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Fixed benefit, fixed cost (ff) Concentrated benefit, fixed cost (cf)
⋯⋯ −𝑐−𝑐
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Supplementary Figure 6: Diffuse versus concentrated benefits. When a producer (center) has a rival good of total
benefit b and cost c available to donate, two ways to distribute this good are a to all k neighbors, divided evenly,
and b to a single individual, chosen at random from all neighbors. The former describes the scheme of ff-goods
considered extensively in the text. The latter method represents a stochastic payoff scheme in which one lucky
neighbor benefits from the good in its entirety. Remarkably, both methods result in identical critical benefit-to-cost
ratios in the limit of weak selection (see SI). Therefore, the surprising behavior reported for ff-goods also apply to
this alternative scheme.
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Supplementary Figure 7: Four update rules driving evolutionary dynamics through imitation. When considering
how to imitate a neighbor’s action (A or B) based on payoff, four natural update rules arise, which have each been
considered extensively in the literature. Pairwise-comparison (PC) updating involves an individual choosing a
random neighbor (yellow) with whom he or she compares payoffs. There is an option to imitate the neighbor, but
the focal individual (green) may also choose to retain their existing action. Imitation (IM) updating is similar to this
rule, except that the payoff comparison involves a focal individual and all neighbors. Again, this individual can
imitate a neighbor but does not have to do so. If one insists that one of these neighbors must be imitated, then we
have death-birth (DB) updating. In this case, the green individual is effectively chosen for death because retaining
its existing action is not an option. The final logical case is when, like in PC updating, only a single neighbor is
chosen for comparison. This time, however, the focal individual must imitate this neighbor. This model turns out
to be equivalent to DB updating when there is no game (i.e. a neutral process) and is therefore not relevant to
studying the effects of selection in our model. We discuss the remaining three rules, PC, DB, and IM, in the SI. Our
general results (Figure 2 and SI) can also account for many update rules beyond these simple examples.
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Homogeneous population structures Heterogeneous population structures
Social good Exists?
Can evolve?
Exists?
Can evolve?
PC DB IM PC DB IM
pp w, h − w w w, h w w w
ff w, h − w w w, h, wh w, h, wh w, h, wh w, h, wh
pf w, h − w w w, h, wh w, h, wh w, h, wh w, h, wh
= wealth-producing
= harmful
= wealth-producing and harmful
w
h
wh
Supplementary Figure 8: Summary of main examples. A good is wealth-producing (w) if the total payoff (sum
of all benefits minus sum of all costs) is positive when everyone in the population is a producer. It is harmful if at
least one individual has a negative payoff in the all-producer state. For three kinds of social goods (pp, ff, and pf)
and update rules (PC, DB, and IM), this table summarizes when a good can be wealth-producing and/or harmful,
as well as when such a good can evolve. Notably, these results are not influence much by the choice of update rule.
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Supplementary Figure 9: Distributions of critical ratios on small graphs. There are 11,989,763 undirected, un-
weighted graphs of size at most N = 10. Of those that can support the evolution of prosocial behaviors, the critical
benefit-to-cost ratios are given for PC updating, a, and DB updating, b.
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Supplementary Figure 10: Graphs of size N 6 10 that most easily support prosocial behavior. For PC and DB
updating, we illustrate the 100 graphs with the lowest positive critical ratios for pp- and ff-goods. In each case, the
graphs are colored according to their critical ratios. In these examples, ff-goods result in lower critical ratios than
pp-goods, and DB updating tends to give lower ratios than PC updating.
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Supplementary Figure 11: Fixed cost on a dense cluster of stars. Consider a population consisting of m stars, each
of size n, connected by a complete graph at their hubs. Provided m > 1, this structure results in extremely low
critical ratios under both PC and DB updating when n is large. Illustrated here is the case in which m = 5. This
structure has the interesting property that ff-goods result in lower critical thresholds than pf-goods (both of which
are lower than that of pp-goods, which is not depicted here). Qualitatively, the results are similar for both PC and
DB updating, with the exception that producers can never be favored by selection on the star (m = 1) under DB
updating but can be favored under PC updating. We derive explicit formulas for (b/c)∗ for any m and n in the SI.
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Supplementary Figure 12: Comparing PC and DB updating on the rich club. For m = 6, we illustrate the effects
of increasing n under PC and DB updating. Under PC updating, the critical ratio for pp-goods approaches 4m− 1
while those of ff- and pf-goods approach 0. For DB updating with m > 1, only ff-goods have a positive critical ratio
when n is large. This ratio is negative for both pp- and pf-goods, so the production of an ff-good is the only one
that can be supported by selection on such a graph. For an ff-good with benefit b and cost c, as n grows large the
all-producer state results in a payoff that approaches ∞ to each of the m individuals and a payoff that approaches
−c to each of the n individuals. Therefore, in this case the title “rich” applies to actual wealth in addition to the
abundance of connections within the society. We give explicit formulas for (b/c)∗ for any m and n in the SI.
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Supplementary Figure 13: Critical ratios on Facebook friendship networks. Critical ratios for pp- and ff-goods
on 20 Facebook networks [47, 48] of size between 762 and 3887 under both PC and DB updating. Although the
critical ratios differ under PC and DB updating, the relative rankings are similar under the two update rules and,
importantly, all critical ratios are positive.
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Supplementary Figure 14: Contributions by producers to a public pool can ameliorate payoff inequality. For
ff-goods, suppose that each producer (blue) donates θb to a pool (green) and (1− θ) b to neighbors, a. If the total
value of the public pool is divided among all members of the population (green arrows, b), then the situation can
improve for those who are worst-off in the all-producer state. In particular, such a pool can result in a positive
payoff to everyone in the population provided the contribution, quantified by θ, is sufficiently large. The trade-off
is that this pool also increases the critical benefit-to-cost ratio required for producers to evolve by a multiplicative
factor of 1/ (1− θ) (see SI), illustrated in c on a star of size N = 100 under PC updating. For this population
structure, d depicts the payoff of the poorest individual (“leaf” player, at the periphery of the star) in the prosocial
(all-A) state as a function of the fraction contributed to the pool, θ, when b = 2 and c = 1. This payoff is negative
when θ / 1/2, which means that 99% of the population is better off in the asocial (all-B) state. However, when
θ ' 1/2, all individuals are better off when donors proliferate.
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Supporting Information
SI.1 Formally modeling evolutionary dynamics
In this section, we formally establish the conditions for A to be favored over B stated in the main text.
The notation and modeling techniques follow the conventions of Allen and McAvoy [32].
Since we model two types, A and B, in a population of finite size, N, the state of the population is
specified by the configuration of A and B. For simplicity, we denote the state of the population by a
binary vector, x ∈ {0, 1}N , where xi = 1 means that the individual at location i is has type A, and xi = 0
means that this individual has type B. We denote by A := (1, 1, . . . , 1) and B := (0, 0, . . . , 0) the two
monomorphic (or monoallelic) states, respectively.
We describe evolutionary dynamics using the notion of a replacement rule [31, 32]. A replacement
rule is a distribution
{
p(R,α) (x)
}
(R,α)
over pairs (R, α), where R is a subset of {1, . . . , N} and α is a
map R → {1, . . . , N}. R is the set of individuals replaced in a given time step, and α is the parentage
map, which means that α (i) = j if and only if the offspring of j replaces i. The probability of choosing
replacement event (R, α), which is denoted by p(R,α) (x), usually depends on the current population
state, x ∈ {0, 1}N , because an individual’s type can influence the probability with which they reproduce
and/or die.
The notion of a replacement rule is flexible enough to accommodate a wide variety of models of
spatially structured populations[31, 32]. Although the update rules considered in the main text have
exactly one individual replaced per time-step (in our notation, p(R,α) (x) = 0 whenever |R| 6= 1) the
results of this section allow for any fixed or variable number of individuals to be replaced. In Section
SI.2 we give specific formulas for p(R,α) (x) for various update rules.
We assume that
{
p(R,α) (x)
}
(R,α)
satisfies the following property [32], which formally states that
there is at least one individual that is eventually an ancestor of the entire population:
Fixation Axiom. There exists i, an integer m, and a sequence {(Rk, αk)}mk=1 such that
• p(Rk ,αk) (x) > 0 for every k ∈ {1, . . . , m} and x ∈ {0, 1}N ;
• i ∈ Rk for some k ∈ {1, . . . , m};
• α˜1 ◦ α˜2 ◦ · · · ◦ α˜m (j) = i for every j ∈ {1, . . . , N}, where α˜ : {1, . . . , N} → {1, . . . , N} denotes the
extension of α : R→ {1, . . . , N} to all of {1, . . . , N}, i.e.
α˜ (j) :=

α (j) j ∈ R,
j j 6∈ R.
(SI.1)
We now describe how a replacement event affects the state of the population. Suppose that the
current state is x ∈ {0, 1}N . Following the replacement event (R, α), individual i inherits his or her type
from α˜ (i); thus, the type of i is updated from xi to xα˜(i). We denote by xα˜ this resulting state.
Given a replacement rule
{
p(R,α) (x)
}
(R,α)
, we can then define a Markov chain on {0, 1}N , with the
transition probability between x and y in {0, 1}N given by
Px→y := ∑
(R,α)
xα˜=y
p(R,α) (x) . (SI.2)
Since Aα˜ = A and Bα˜ = B for every replacement event, (R, α), we see that A and B are absorbing
states for this chain. Moreover, the Fixation Axiom implies that every non-monomorphic state is tran-
sient, which implies that the chain will eventually end up in either A or B given any initial state. We are
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particularly interested in rare-mutant states, which for us means that there are N− 1 of type A and one
of type B or N − 1 of type B and one of type A. Denote by ρiA (resp. ρiB) the probability that A (resp. B)
is reached from the state with just a single A (resp. B) at i. The mean fixation probabilities of A and B
are then ρA := (1/N)∑Ni=1 ρ
i
A and ρB := (1/N)∑
N
i=1 ρ
i
B, respectively. This section is dedicated to using
a replacement rule to derive a condition for selection to favor type A relative to type B, i.e. ρA > ρB.
SI.1.1 Demographic variables
The marginal probability of transmission from i to j in state x ∈ {0, 1}N is
eij (x) := ∑
(R,α)
α(j)=i
p(R,α) (x) . (SI.3)
From these marginal probabilities come birth rates and death probabilities,
bi (x) :=
N
∑
j=1
eij (x) ; (SI.4a)
di (x) :=
N
∑
j=1
eji (x) . (SI.4b)
Since the population size is fixed, the average birth rate, b (x) = 1N ∑
N
i=1 bi (x), coincides with the average
death probability, d (x) = 1N ∑
N
i=1 di (x), in every state, x ∈ {0, 1}N .
In order to define a notion of weak selection, we let
{
p(R,α) (x)
}
(R,α)
depend on a non-negative
parameter, δ > 0, which quantifies the intensity of selection within the population. We assume that
p(R,α) (x) is continuously-differentiable in a neighborhood of δ = 0, and we use the “prime” notation
(e.g. e′ij) to denote the δ-derivative evaluated at δ = 0. We further assume that, for δ = 0, p(R,α) (x) is
independent of x (as are the demographic variables derived from the replacement rule). We refer to the
case δ = 0 as neutral drift, and we use the superscript ◦ to denote this special case (e.g. e◦ij).
SI.1.2 Reproductive value
Suppose that {vi}Ni=1 consists of scalars such that, for every i = 1, . . . , N,
N
∑
j=1
e◦ijvj =
N
∑
j=1
e◦jivi. (SI.5)
The (unique) solution to Equation SI.5 satisfying ∑Ni=1 vi = N is the so-called “reproductive value” (RV)
of i [49, 50]. Reproductive values define a distribution, pi, with pii := vi/N, which coincides with
the probability that, under neutral drift, i generates a lineage that takes over the population [32], i.e.
ρ◦i = vi/N.
Let b̂i (x) := ∑Nj=1 eij (x) vj and d̂i (x) := ∑
N
j=1 eji (x) vi be the RV-weighted birth and death rates,
respectively. The mean change in ∑Ni=1 vixi, the RV-weighted abundance of A in state x is
∆̂sel (x) :=
N
∑
i=1
xi
(
b̂i (x)− d̂i (x)
)
, (SI.6)
which enjoys the convenient property that ∆̂◦sel (x) = 0 for every x.
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SI.1.3 Mutation and the RMC distribution
For u ∈ [0, 1], consider the Markov chain on {0, 1}N with transition probabilities
P˜x→y :=

u/N + (1− u) PA→y x = A, y = 1/N,
(1− u) PA→y x = A, y 6= 1/N,
u/N + (1− u) PB→y x = B, y = 1− 1/N,
(1− u) PB→y x = B, y 6= 1− 1/N,
Px→y x 6∈ {A, B} .
(SI.7)
In other words, transitions from a non-monomorphic state are the same as in the mutation-free process;
in a monomorphic state, a single mutant type (B in the all-A state and A in the all-B state) will arise with
probability u, and the initial location of this mutant is chosen uniformly-at-random from the vertices
(see Figure SI.1). When u = 0, we have P˜x→y = Px→y for every x, y ∈ {0, 1}N . But when u > 0,
this Markov chain has a single closed communicating class by the Fixation Axiom, so it has a unique
stationary distribution, piMSS.
In order to get a better understanding of the transient-state dynamics, we define
piRMC (x) := lim
u→0
piMSS (x)
1− piMSS (A)− piMSS (B) , (SI.8)
which we call the rare-mutation conditional (RMC) distribution. One may also characterize the RMC
distribution as the stationary distribution for the chain on {0, 1}N − {A, B} defined by
PRMCx→y :=

Px→y + 1N Px→A y =
1
N ,
Px→y + 1N Px→B y = 1− 1N ,
Px→y 1N < y < 1− 1N .
(SI.9)
The definitions of both of these chains (Equations. SI.7 and SI.9) are slightly different from their defini-
tions given in Allen and McAvoy [32], but nonetheless they have the following properties (whose proofs
follow from the arguments of Allen and McAvoy [32]):
Fact 1. limu→0 piMSS (A) = ρA/ (ρA + ρB) and limu→0 piMSS (B) = ρB/ (ρA + ρB);
Fact 2. The quantity
K := lim
u→0
u
(1− piMSS (A)− piMSS (B)) (SI.10)
is strictly positive and differentiable in δ in a small neighborhood of δ = 0;
Fact 3. ERMC [ϕ] = K ddu
∣∣∣
u=0
EMSS [ϕ] for any ϕ : {0, 1}N → R with ϕ (A) = ϕ (B) = 0.
Fact 4. E◦RMC [xi] = 1/2 for i = 1, . . . , N.
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Supplementary Figure SI.1: Mutation and absorption into one of the two monomorphic states. A single mu-
tant arises with probability u and is placed at location i with probability 1/N. Mutants do not arise in the non-
monomorphic states, and eventually the process returns to a monomorphic state (all-A with probability ρiA and
all-B with probability ρiB = 1− ρiA) by the Fixation Axiom. The mean fixation probabilities of A and be are then
ρA = (1/N)∑Ni=1 ρ
i
A and ρB = (1/N)∑
N
i=1 ρ
i
B, respectively. When u > 0, the resulting Markov chain has a unique
stationary distribution, piMSS, which can be used to understand when ρA > ρB.
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SI.1.4 Type distributions under neutral drift
The probability that i and j have the same type in the neutral RMC distribution is
xij := E◦RMC
[
xixj + (1− xi)
(
1− xj
)]
= 2E◦RMC
[
xixj
]
. (SI.11)
Let K◦ := limu→0 u/
(
1− pi◦MSS (A)− pi◦MSS (B)
)
be the value of K at δ = 0. If i 6= j, then
E◦RMC
[
xixj
]
= ∑
x 6=A,B
pi◦RMC (x) xixj
= ∑
x,y 6=A,B
pi◦RMC (y) P
RMC
y→x xixj
= ∑
x,y 6=A,B
pi◦RMC (y) Py→xxixj + ∑
y 6=A,B
pi◦RMC (y) ∑
` 6=i,j
1
N
Py→B
= ∑
y 6=A,B
pi◦RMC (y) ∑
(R,α)
p◦(R,α)yα˜(i)yα˜(j) − ∑
y 6=A,B
pi◦RMC (y) Py→A
+ ∑
y 6=A,B
pi◦RMC (y) ∑
` 6=i,j
1
N
Py→B
= ∑
(R,α)
p◦(R,α)E
◦
RMC
[
xα˜(i)xα˜(j)
]
− ∑
y 6=A,B
pi◦RMC (y) Py→A
+
N − 2
N ∑y 6=A,B
pi◦RMC (y) Py→B
= ∑
(R,α)
p◦(R,α)E
◦
RMC
[
xα˜(i)xα˜(j)
]
− K
◦
2
+
N − 2
N
K◦
2
= ∑
(R,α)
p◦(R,α)E
◦
RMC
[
xα˜(i)xα˜(j)
]
− K
◦
N
, (SI.12)
Letting τij :=
(
1− xij
)
/2K◦ = E◦RMC
[
x− xixj
]
/K◦ gives, for i 6= j, the recurrence relation
τij =
1
N
+ ∑
(R,α)
p◦(R,α)τ˜α(i)α˜(j). (SI.13)
For i = j, we have τii = 0 for every i = 1, . . . , N. This system of equations uniquely determines
{
τij
}N
i,j=1.
SI.1.5 Payoffs, fecundities, and social goods
In the class of evolutionary processes considered here, interactions result in payoffs, which are then con-
verted into fecundities. These fecundities are used to update the state of the population. More abstractly,
every state x ∈ {0, 1}N results in a vector of fecundities, F ∈ [0,∞)N (one entry for every individual).
However, this state-to-fecundity mapping need not be deterministic; it could also be stochastic (Supple-
mentary Figure 6). In this section, we show that stochastic mappings can be reduced to deterministic
mappings under weak selection.
In practice, state-based replacement rules (introduced in §SI.1.1) often depend on the state, x, only
through its effect on fecundity. In other words, if there is a deterministic state-to-fecundity map, x 7→
F (x), where F ∈ [0,∞)N , then p(R,α) (x) = p(R,α) (F (x)). To avoid confusion when we consider stochastic
state-to-fecundity mappings below, we denote by p(R,α) a replacement rule that is a function of state,
x, and by q(R,α) a replacement rule that is a function of fecundity, F. For example, DB updating in a
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graph-structured population,
(
wij
)N
i,j=1, is defined by the rule
q(R,α) (F) =

1
N
Fα(i)wα(i)i
∑Nj=1 Fjwji
R = {i} for some i,
0 otherwise.
(SI.14)
In most traditional formulations of evolutionary games with death-birth updating, there exists a payoff
function u : {0, 1}N → RN that gives a payoff vector for the population as a function of the state, x. The
payoff for player i, ui (x), is then converted to fecundity, Fi (x), by letting Fi (x) := exp {δui (x)} for some
selection intensity parameter, δ > 0. Thus, we can write
p(R,α) (x) =

1
N
Fα(i)(x)wα(i)i
∑Nj=1 Fjwji
R = {i} for some i,
0 otherwise.
(SI.15)
Suppose now that we have a fixed fecundity-based replacement rule, q, together with a stochastic
state-to-fecundity mapping. Thus, for every state x ∈ {0, 1}N , there is a distribution over fecundity
vectors F ∈ [0,∞)N . If Ex denotes expectation with respect to this distribution, then one obtains a
state-based rule,
p(R,α) (x) := Ex
[
q(R,α)
]
. (SI.16)
We consider fecundity-based replacement rules for which q(R,α) (F) = q◦(R,α)+ δq
′
(R,α) (F) +O
(
δ2
)
for
some function q′(R,α) (F) whenever δ  1. Moreover, we assume that the distribution on fecundity is
determined by random payoffs. Specifically, every individual, i, receives a payoff, ui, based on some
probability distribution. This payoff is then converted to fecundity via the formula Fi (δ) = exp {δui},
where δ > 0 is the intensity of selection. It follows that
d
dδ
Ex [Fi (δ)] = Ex
[
F′i (δ)
]
(SI.17)
for every i = 1, . . . , N.
Consider the “averaged” replacement rule, p(R,α) (x) := q(R,α) (Ex [F]). By the chain rule,
p(R,α) (x) = Ex
[
q(R,α)
]
= q◦(R,α) + δEx
[
q′(R,α)
]
+O
(
δ2
)
= q◦(R,α) + δ
N
∑
i=1
∂q(R,α)
∂Fi
∣∣∣∣∣
F=F(0)
Ex
[
F′i (0)
]
+O
(
δ2
)
= q◦(R,α) + δ
N
∑
i=1
∂q(R,α)
∂Fi
∣∣∣∣∣
F=F(0)
dEx [Fi (δ)]
dδ
∣∣∣∣∣
δ=0
+O
(
δ2
)
. (SI.18)
It follows that
d
dδ
∣∣∣∣∣
δ=0
p(R,α) (x) =
d
dδ
∣∣∣∣∣
δ=0
p(R,α) (x) . (SI.19)
From this equation, together with the fact that fixation probabilities are defined by a linear systems
with coefficients based on the replacement rule, we conclude that the first-order behavior of the fixation
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probabilities must coincide under realized and expected payoffs. Thus, without a loss of generality, we
may now assume that the state-to-fecundity mapping is deterministic.
Suppose that type A at location i pays Cij to donate Bij to j. Type B at this same location pays cij
to donate bij to j. Although this formulation accounts for general additive interactions, we are mostly
interested in the case in which A is a producer and B is a non-producer, meaning bij = cij = 0 for every
i and j. In the most general case, however, the cumulative payoff to i is
ui (x) =
N
∑
j=1
(−xiCij − (1− xi) cij + xjBji + (1− xj) bji) . (SI.20)
This formulation can account for both accumulated and averaged payoffs due to the dependence of Bij,
Cij, bij, and cij on both i and j; we give explicit examples along these lines in §SI.3.
SI.1.6 Marginal replacement effects
By the results of §SI.1.5, we may assume (without a loss of generality) that the payoff-to-fecundity map
is deterministic. Let u : {0, 1}N → RN be a payoff function that assigns a real number, ui (x), to each
individual, i, and state, x. Individual i’s payoff is then converted to fecundity by Fi (x) := exp {δui (x)}.
Moreover, we assume that for every x ∈ {0, 1}N , we have eij (x) = eij (F) (meaning eij depends on x
only through the effects of x on fecundity). Letting mijk :=
∂
∂Fk
∣∣∣
F=F(0)
eij (F) be the marginal effect of k on i
replacing j, we see that
e′ij (x) =
N
∑
k=1
 ∂
∂Fk
∣∣∣∣∣
F=F(0)
eij (F)
( d
dδ
∣∣∣∣∣
δ=0
Fk (δ)
)
=
N
∑
k=1
mijk uk (x) . (SI.21)
Note, in particular, that mijk is independent of the payoffs and structure of the game. It can also be easily
calculated for any process from the details of the update rule; we give examples below.
SI.1.7 Condition for evolutionary success of A relative to B
Our condition for the success of A relative to B is based on the following result, which is a modification
of Theorem 8 of Allen and McAvoy [32]:
Lemma 1. For the class of processes described herein,
ρ′A > ρ
′
B ⇐⇒ E◦RMC
[
∆̂′sel
]
> 0. (SI.22)
Sketch of proof. The expected change in RV-weighted abundance of A in state x is
∆̂ (x) =

−u x = A,
u x = B,
∆̂sel (x) x 6∈ {A, B} .
(SI.23)
Since this expected change must average out to 0 over the stationary distribution for the chain,
0 = EMSS
[
∆̂
]
= EMSS
[
∆̂sel
]
− upiMSS (A) + upiMSS (B) . (SI.24)
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Differentiating this equation with respect to u at u = 0 gives
1
K
ERMC
[
∆̂sel
]
= lim
u→0 (
piMSS (A)− piMSS (B))
=
ρA − ρB
ρA + ρB
, (SI.25)
where, again, K := limu→0 u/ (1− piMSS (A)− piMSS (B)). Since ∆̂◦sel (x) = 0 for every x ∈ {0, 1}N ,
differentiating Equation SI.25 with respect to δ at δ = 0 gives
1
K◦E
◦
RMC
[
∆̂′sel
]
=
ρ′A − ρ′B
2ρ◦A
. (SI.26)
by Facts 1–3 in §SI.1.3. Since K◦ > 0 and
ρ◦A =
1
N
N
∑
i=1
ρ◦i =
1
N
N
∑
i=1
vi
N
=
1
N
. (SI.27)
(see §SI.1.2), it follows that ρ′A > ρ′B if and only if E◦RMC
[
∆̂′sel
]
> 0, as desired.
Theorem 1.
ρ′A > ρ
′
B ⇐⇒
N
∑
i,j,k,`=1
vim
ji
k
(
−
(
xjk − xik
)
(Ck` − ck`) +
(
xj` − xi`
)
(B`k − b`k)
)
> 0. (SI.28)
Proof. A straightforward calculation using the definition mijk :=
∂
∂Fk
∣∣∣
F=F(0)
eij (F) gives
∆̂′sel (x) =
N
∑
i=1
xi
(
b̂′i (x)− d̂′i (x)
)
=
N
∑
i,j=1
xi
(
e′ij (x) vj − e′ji (x) vi
)
=
N
∑
i,j=1
vi
(
xj − xi
)
e′ji (x)
=
N
∑
i,j,k=1
vim
ji
k
(
xj − xi
)
uk (x) . (SI.29)
Since xij := 2E◦RMC
[
xixj
]
, we see that
E◦RMC
[(
xj − xi
)
uk (x)
]
= E◦RMC
[(
xj − xi
) N
∑
`=1
(−xkCk`−(1−xk)ck`
+x`B`k+(1−x`)b`k
)]
=
1
2
N
∑
`=1
(
−xjkCk` −
(
1− xjk
)
ck` + xj`B`k +
(
1− xj`
)
b`k
)
− 1
2
N
∑
`=1
(−xikCk` − (1− xik) ck` + xi`B`k + (1− xi`) b`k)
=
1
2
N
∑
`=1
(
−xjk (Ck` − ck`) + xj` (B`k − b`k)
)
− 1
2
N
∑
`=1
(−xik (Ck` − ck`) + xi` (B`k − b`k)) . (SI.30)
The theorem then follows at once from Lemma 1.
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Corollary 1. When A is a producer and B is a non-producer (bij = cij = 0 for every i and j),
ρ′A > ρ
′
B ⇐⇒
N
∑
i,j,k,`=1
vim
ji
k
(
−xjkCk` + xj`B`k
)
>
N
∑
i,j,k,`=1
vim
ji
k (−xikCk` + xi`B`k) . (SI.31)
Remark 1. Although Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 are stated in terms of xij, they can be evaluated by
replacing xij by −τij since τij :=
(
1− xij
)
/2K◦ for some K◦ > 0. τ can be easily calculated using
Equation SI.13 and the fact that τii = 0 for i = 1, . . . , N. However, the statements of Theorem 1 and
Corollary 1 are somewhat more intuitive using these probabilities, xij, directly, since then the constituent
terms can be interpreted as expected payoffs.
Returning to Equation 1 in the main text, let (i) Pji be the probability that a producer in location j
replaces a random individual in location i and (ii) Qji be the probability that a random individual in
location j replaces a producer in location i. Since P◦ji = Q
◦
ji (i.e. when δ = 0) and
P′ji =
N
∑
k,`=1
mjik
(
−xjkCk` + xj`B`k
)
; (SI.32a)
Q′ji =
N
∑
k,`=1
mjik (−xikCk` + xi`B`k) , (SI.32b)
we see that the signs of the first-order terms of ρA − ρB and ∑Ni,j=1 vi
(
Pji −Qji
)
agree.
SI.1.8 Relationship to inclusive fitness theory
Inclusive fitness theory [51–53] is often used to model the evolution of social behavior. According to
this theory, individuals evolve to act as if maximizing a quantity called inclusive fitness, which is a sum
of fitness effects caused by an actor, each weighted by relatedness to the recipient. Careful analysis has
revealed that to define the inclusive fitness of an individual requires weak selection, additivity of fitness
effects, and other assumptions[53–55], which hold in the model considered here.
Before identifying inclusive fitness effects, we must define individual fitness. The fitness of a vertex
i in a given state x can be defined as[32]
ωi (x) = vi + b̂i (x)− d̂i (x) = vi +
N
∑
j=1
(
eij (x) vj − eji (x) vi
)
. (SI.33)
We observe that for neutral drift, fitness is simply equal to reproductive value, ω◦i = vi. For weak
selection, we have
ω′i (x) =
N
∑
j=1
(
e′ij (x) vj − e′ji (x) vi
)
. (SI.34)
From Equation SI.21, this can be written as
ω′i (x) =
N
∑
k=1
Mikuk (x) , (SI.35)
where the quantity
Mik :=
∂
∂Fk
∣∣∣∣∣
F=F(0)
(
eij (F) vj − eji (F) vi
)
=
N
∑
j=1
(
mijk vj −m
ji
k vi
)
(SI.36)
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describes how the payoff to vertex k affects the fitness of vertex i. We observe from Equations (SI.29) and (SI.34)
that
∆̂′sel (x) =
N
∑
i=1
xiω′i (x) . (SI.37)
Substituting from Equation SI.20, we obtain
ω′i (x) =
N
∑
k=1
[
Mik
N
∑
`=1
(−xkCk` − (1− xk) ck` + x`B`k + (1− x`) b`k)
]
=
N
∑
k=1
[
Mik
N
∑
`=1
(−xkCk` − (1− xk) ck`) +
N
∑
`=1
Mi` (xkBk` + (1− xk) bk`)
]
=
N
∑
k=1
[
xk
N
∑
`=1
(
−Ck`Mik + Bk`Mi`
)
+ (1− xk)
N
∑
`=1
(
−ck`Mik + bk`Mi`
)]
. (SI.38)
The final line of Equation SI.38 expresses the neighbor-modulated fitness of vertex i, in that it identifies
the contribution (fitness effect) of each vertex k to the fitness of i. Specifically, this fitness effect is
∑N`=1
(−Ck`Mik + Bk`Mi`) for vertices k of type A, and ∑N`=1 (−ck`Mik + bk`Mi`) for vertices k of type B.
To move from neighbor-modulated to inclusive fitness, one must causally attribute every fitness effect
on every individual to a particular actor in the population [53, 55]. Even in our simple model, this causal
attribution is rather arbitrary and artificial. For example, if individual i gives benefit Bij to individual j,
which in turn alters individual k’s fitness by an amount Bij Mkj , to whom should this effect on k’s fitness
be causally attributed? To i, to j, or both? To make progress, we adopt the convention that all fitness
effects are attributed to the originator of the social good (e.g., terms of the form Bij Mkj are attributed to
individual i).
To formulate the inclusive fitness of individual i, we now multiply each effect attributable to indi-
vidual i by the relatedness of i to the recipient. For a given state x, we use a notion of “relatedness in
state”, such that the relatedness of two individuals is one if they have the same type and zero otherwise;
as a formula, the relatedness of i and j is xixj + (1− xi)
(
1− xj
)
. (Later, we will average over states to
obtain relatedness coefficients between zero and one.) Multiplying the fitness effects from Eq. (SI.38) by
the corresponding relatedness-in-state coefficients, we obtain the inclusive fitness effect of vertex i in state
x as
ωIFi (x) =

∑Nk,`=1
(
−Ci`Mki + Bi`Mk`
)
xk if i has type A
∑Nk,`=1
(
−ci`Mki + bi`Mk`
)
(1− xk) if i has type B.
(SI.39)
We immediately see that
N
∑
i=1
xiωIFi (x) =
N
∑
i,k=1
(
−Ci`Mki + Bi`Mk`
)
xixk
=
N
∑
i,k=1
(
−Ck`Mik + Bk`Mi`
)
xixk
=
N
∑
i=1
xiω′i (x)
= ∆̂′sel (x) . (SI.40)
This highlights the fact that inclusive fitness, when it exists, is an alternative accounting method that
leads to the same result for the gradient of selection ∆̂′sel (x).
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To obtain fitness quantities that apply to the overall evolutionary process, we average over the neutral
RMC distribution, conditioned on the type of vertex i. First we consider neighbor-modulated fitness. If
vertex i has type A then, noting that E◦RMC
[
xj | xi = 1
]
= xij, we obtain
E◦RMC
[
ω′i (x) | xi = 1
]
=
N
∑
k=1
[
xik
N
∑
`=1
(
−Ck`Mik + Bk`Mi`
)
+ (1− xik)
N
∑
`=1
(
−ck`Mik + bk`Mi`
) ]
. (SI.41)
If i has type B, then since E◦RMC
[
xj | xi = 0
]
= 1− xij, we have
E◦RMC
[
ω′i (x) | xi = 0
]
=
N
∑
k=1
[
(1− xik)
N
∑
`=1
(
−Ck`Mik + Bk`Mi`
)
+ xik
N
∑
`=1
(
−ck`Mik + bk`Mi`
) ]
. (SI.42)
Now turning to inclusive fitness, we have
E◦RMC
[
ωIFi (x) | xi = 1
]
=
N
∑
k,`=1
(
−Ci`Mki + Bi`Mk`
)
xik, (SI.43)
for type A, and
E◦RMC
[
ωIFi (x) | xi = 0
]
=
N
∑
k,`=1
(
−ci`Mki + bi`Mk`
)
xik, (SI.44)
for type B.
From Equation SI.40 we have E◦RMC
[
∆̂′sel
]
= E◦RMC
[
∑Ni=1 xiω
IF
i
]
= E◦RMC
[
∑Ni=1 xiω
′
i
]
, again demon-
strating the equivalence of the neighbor-modulated and inclusive fitness accounting methods, in the
case of this model.
SI.2 Specific update rules
We now turn to specific examples of update rules (Supplementary Figure 7) in graph-structured pop-
ulations. Let
(
wij
)N
i,j=1 be an undirected, unweighted, connected graph on N vertices. The degree of
vertex i is simply the number of links connected to that vertex, i.e. wi := ∑Nj=1 wij. This graph defines
the structure of the population, with links indicating neighbor relationships.
SI.2.1 Pairwise-comparison (PC) updating
Under PC updating (see Supplementary Figure 7), the probability of replacement event (R, α) is
p(R,α) (x) =

1
N piα(i)
Fα(i)(x)
Fi(x)+Fα(i)(x)
R = {i} for some i ∈ {1, . . . , N} , α (i) 6= i,
1
N ∑
N
j=1 pij
Fi(x)
Fi(x)+Fj(x)
R = {i} for some i ∈ {1, . . . , N} , α (i) = i,
0 otherwise.
(SI.45)
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For i, j = 1, . . . , N, the marginal probability that i transmits its offspring to j 6= i is
eij (x) =
1
N
pji
Fi (x)
Fi (x) + Fj (x)
, (SI.46)
which gives a marginal effect of k on i replacing j 6= i of
mijk =

1
4N pji k = i,
− 14N pji k = j,
0 k 6= i, j.
(SI.47)
It follows that
N
∑
i,j,k,`=1
vim
ji
k
(
−xjkCk` + xj`B`k
)
=
N
∑
i,j=1
vi
[
1
4N
pij
N
∑
`=1
(
−xjjCj` + xj`B`j
)
− 1
4N
pij
N
∑
`=1
(
−xjiCi` + xj`B`i
) ]
; (SI.48a)
N
∑
i,j,k,`=1
vim
ji
k (−xikCk` + xi`B`k) =
N
∑
i,j=1
vi
[
1
4N
pij
N
∑
`=1
(
−xijCj` + xi`B`j
)
− 1
4N
pij
N
∑
`=1
(−xiiCi` + xi`B`i)
]
. (SI.48b)
The reproductive value of i under PC updating is vi = Nwi/∑Nk=1 wk. Since vi pij = vj pji for every i and
j, it follows that ρA > ρB for small δ > 0 if and only if
N
∑
i=1
wi
N
∑
`=1
(−xiiCi` + xi`B`i) >
N
∑
i,j=1
wi pij
N
∑
`=1
(
−xijCj` + xi`B`j
)
. (SI.49)
To evaluate this condition, recall that we can replace xij by −τij, where, by Equation SI.13,
τij =
1
N
+
1
2N
N
∑
k=1
pikτkj +
1
2N
N
∑
k=1
pjkτik +
(
1− 1
N
)
τij, (SI.50)
which implies that τij = 1+ (1/2)∑Nk=1 pikτkj + (1/2)∑
N
k=1 pjkτik whenever i 6= j. Thus,
ρA > ρB ⇐⇒
N
∑
i,j=1
wi pij
N
∑
`=1
(
τi`B`j − τijCj`
)
>
N
∑
i=1
wi
N
∑
`=1
τi`B`i. (SI.51)
SI.2.2 Death-birth (DB) updating
Under DB updating (see Supplementary Figure 7), the probability of replacement event (R, α) is
p(R,α) (x) =

1
N
wiα(i)Fα(i)(x)
∑Nk=1 wik Fk(x)
R = {i} for some i ∈ {1, . . . , N} ,
0 otherwise.
(SI.52)
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For i, j = 1, . . . , N, the marginal probability that i transmits its offspring to j is
eij (x) =
1
N
wjiFi (x)
∑Nk=1 wjkFk (x)
. (SI.53)
Therefore, the marginal effect of k on i replacing j is
mijk =

1
N pji
(
1− pji
)
k = i,
− 1N pji pjk k 6= i.
(SI.54)
Again, the reproductive value of i is vi = Nwi/∑Nk=1 wk. Since vi pij = vj pji for every i and j,
N
∑
i,j,k,`=1
vim
ji
k
(
−xjkCk` + xj`B`k
)
=
N
∑
i=1
vi
1
N
N
∑
`=1
(−xiiCi` + xi`B`i)
−
N
∑
i=1
vi
N
∑
k=1
1
N
p(2)ik
N
∑
`=1
(−xikCk` + xi`B`k) ; (SI.55a)
N
∑
i,j,k,`=1
vim
ji
k (−xikCk` + xi`B`k) = 0. (SI.55b)
Consequently, we see that ρA > ρB for small δ > 0 if and only if
N
∑
i=1
wi
N
∑
`=1
(−xiiCi` + xi`B`i) >
N
∑
i,j=1
wi p
(2)
ij
N
∑
`=1
(
−xijCj` + xi`B`j
)
. (SI.56)
Again, to evaluate this condition, for i 6= j we can replace xij by −τij, where, by Equation SI.13,
τij =
1
N
+
1
N
N
∑
k=1
pikτkj +
1
N
N
∑
k=1
pjkτik +
(
1− 2
N
)
τij, (SI.57)
which implies that τij = 1/2 + (1/2)∑Nk=1 pikτkj + (1/2)∑
N
k=1 pjkτik whenever i 6= j. Since we can
evaluate Equation SI.56 using any non-zero multiple of τ, it suffices to replace τ by 2τ and use the
recurrence τij = 1 + (1/2)∑Nk=1 pikτkj + (1/2)∑
N
k=1 pjkτik when i 6= j, the same as that of PC updating
[and also of 28, 32, 36]. Thus,
ρA > ρB ⇐⇒
N
∑
i,j=1
wi p
(2)
ij
N
∑
`=1
(
τi`B`j − τijCj`
)
>
N
∑
i=1
wi
N
∑
`=1
τi`B`i. (SI.58)
SI.2.3 Imitation (IM) updating
Under IM updating (see Supplementary Figure 7), the probability of replacement event (R, α) is
p(R,α) (x) =

1
N
wiα(i)Fα(i)(x)
Fi(x)+∑Nk=1 wik Fk(x)
R = {i} for some i ∈ {1, . . . , N} , α (i) 6= i,
1
N
Fi(x)
Fi(x)+∑Nk=1 wik Fk(x)
R = {i} for some i ∈ {1, . . . , N} , α (i) = i,
0 otherwise.
(SI.59)
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For i, j = 1, . . . , N, the probability that i transmits its offspring to j 6= i is
eij (x) =
1
N
wjiFi (x)
Fj (x) +∑Nk=1 wjkFk (x)
, (SI.60)
and the marginal effect of k on i replacing j 6= i is
mijk =

1
N
wji
wj+1
(
1− wjiwj+1
)
k = i,
− 1N
( wji
wj+1
)2
k = j,
− 1N
wji
wj+1
wjk
wj+1
k 6= i, j.
(SI.61)
Let
(
w′ij
)N
i,j=1
be the matrix defined by wii = 1 and w′ij = wij for i 6= j. We also define an analogue of
pij = wij/wi, namely p′ij := w
′
ij/w
′
i . Under IM updating, reproductive value is now vi = Nw
′
i/∑
N
k=1 w
′
k.
Since vi p′ij = vj p
′
ji for every i and j, a straightforward calculation gives
N
∑
i,j,k,`=1
vim
ji
k
(
−xjkCk` + xj`B`k
)
−
N
∑
i,j,k,`=1
vim
ji
k (−xikCk` + xi`B`k)
=
1
N
N
∑
i,`=1
vi (−xiiCi` + xi`B`i)− 1N
N
∑
i,j,`=1
vi
(
p′
)(2)
ij
(
−xijCj` + xi`B`j
)
(SI.62)
Therefore, ρA > ρB for small δ > 0 if and only if
N
∑
i=1
w′i
N
∑
`=1
(−xiiCi` + xi`B`i) >
N
∑
i,j=1
w′i
(
p′
)(2)
ij
N
∑
`=1
(
−xijCj` + xi`B`j
)
. (SI.63)
To evaluate this condition, we replace xij by −τij, where, for i 6= j,
τij =
1
N
+
1
N
N
∑
k=1
p′ikτkj +
1
N
N
∑
k=1
p′jkτik +
(
1− 2
N
)
τij, (SI.64)
which gives the recurrence τij = 1/2 + (1/2)∑Nk=1 p
′
ikτkj + (1/2)∑
N
k=1 p
′
jkτik. Again, we can replace
τ by 2τ (since Equation SI.63 can be evaluated using any non-zero multiple of τ) and use τij = 1 +
(1/2)∑Nk=1 p
′
ikτkj + (1/2)∑
N
k=1 p
′
jkτik when i 6= j. Therefore,
ρA > ρB ⇐⇒
N
∑
i,j=1
w′i
(
p′
)(2)
ij
N
∑
`=1
(
τi`B`j − τijCj`
)
>
N
∑
i=1
w′i
N
∑
`=1
τi`B`i. (SI.65)
We note that this condition, as well as τ, can be obtained from the corresponding results for DB updating
by replacing w with w′ and p with p′.
SI.3 Specific social goods
For the three main kinds of social goods we consider, we have
(
Bij, Cij
)
=

(
bwij, cwij
)
pp,
(
bwij/wi, cwij/wi
)
ff,
(
bwij, cwij/wi
)
pf.
(SI.66)
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When considering the differences between fixed and proportional benefits and costs, there is one more
case: fp (fixed benefits and proportional costs), i.e.
(
Bij, Cij
)
=
(
bwij/wi, cwij
)
. However, this kind of
good is somewhat less natural than the others because it involves the production of a good with fixed
total benefit whose cost rises with the number of recipients. A good of this form could model a situation
in which the cost is tied to the transmission of the good rather than its production. For example, consider
a rival, divisible good that is either costless to produce (or else is readily available to a donor, who does
not need to “produce” it). Then, if there are k neighbors, each one gets b/k, where b is the benefit of
the good. But if the process of transmitting or delivering the good costs c per recipient, then the total
benefit is b and the total cost is kc. While our general theory can account for this kind of good, we focus
primarily on the other three.
SI.3.1 PC updating
Combining the formulas for Bij and Cij in Equation SI.66 with Equation 7 gives ρA > ρB under weak
selection if and only if b/c > (b/c)∗, where (b/c)∗ is the expression of Equation 9,
(
b
c
)∗
=

∑Ni,j=1 wijwjτji
∑Ni,j,k=1 wij(wjk−wik)τki
pp,
∑Ni,j=1 wijτji
∑Ni,j,k=1 wij(pkj−pki)τki
ff,
∑Ni,j=1 wijτji
∑Ni,j,k=1 wij(wjk−wik)τki
pf.
(SI.67)
On regular graphs of degree d, all individuals have exactly d neighbors, and there is a simple corre-
spondence between different kinds of donations. For pp-goods, a producer pays dc in total in order to
donate b to each and every neighbor. Thus, ff-goods can be obtained from pp-goods by scaling both b
and c by 1/d. pf-goods can be obtained from pp-goods by scaling c (but not b) by 1/d. But we can say
more: on a d-regular graph, τ satisfies τii = 0 and
τij = 1+
1
2d
N
∑
k=1
wikτkj +
1
2d
N
∑
k=1
wjkτik (SI.68)
whenever i 6= j. A straightforward application of this recurrence then gives
N
∑
i,j,k=1
wijwjkτki = d
N
∑
i,j=1
wijτij − dN. (SI.69)
Therefore,
N
∑
i,j,k=1
wij
(
wjk − wik
)
τki =
N
∑
i,j,k=1
wijwjkτki − d
N
∑
i,k=1
wikτki = −dN. (SI.70)
It follows that the denominators of (b/c)∗ in Equation 9 are negative on regular graphs, so these popu-
lation structures can never support producers over non-producers under PC updating.
We now turn to a couple of examples of heterogeneous graphs:
Example 1 (Cluster of stars). On heterogeneous graphs, the results are much more interesting. Consider,
for example, a cluster of stars conjoined by a complete graph at their hubs (Supplementary Figure 11).
Let i ∼ j indicate that i and j reside on the same star, and let H and L be the set of hubs and leaves of
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the structure, respectively. If there are m stars in total, each of size n, then
τij =

m3+4m2n−3m2+4mn2−6mn−2m+2n2−9n+8
2m2+4mn−6m+2n2−5n+4 i ∈ H, j ∈ L, i ∼ j,
2m3+9m2n−10m2+12mn2−28mn+16m+4n3−14n2+16n−8
2m2+4mn−6m+2n2−5n+4 i ∈ H, j ∈ L, i 6∼ j,
2m3+9m2n−13m2+12mn2−34mn+25m+4n3−16n2+21n−10
2m2+4mn−6m+2n2−5n+4 i ∈ H, j ∈ H, i 6= j,
m3+4m2n−m2+4mn2−2mn−8m+4n2−14n+12
2m2+4mn−6m+2n2−5n+4 i ∈ L, j ∈ L, i ∼ j, i 6= j,
2m3+9m2n−8m2+12mn2−24mn+10m+4n3−12n2+11n−4
2m2+4mn−6m+2n2−5n+4 i ∈ L, j ∈ L, i 6∼ j,
0 i = j
(SI.71)
by Equation SI.13. These quantities give all of the times τ by symmetry.
Using Equation 9, we find that
(
b
c
)∗
=

(
2m2+4mn−6m
+2n2−5n+4
)(
m3+4m2n−7m2+4mn2
−14mn+13m−n2+3n−3
)
(
m4n−3m4+5m3n2−21m3n+22m3+8m2n3−47m2n2+85m2n
−53m2+4mn4−34mn3+88mn2−96mn+42m−2n4+7n3−5n2−n
) pp,
(
2m5+13m4n−21m4+31m3n2−96m3n+78m3
+32m2n3−145m2n2+221m2n−119m2+12mn4
−72mn3+153mn2−144mn+56m−6n3+25n2−32n+12
)
(
m5n−m5+6m4n2−17m4n+9m4+13m3n3−61m3n2+83m3n−29m3
+12m2n4−81m2n3+180m2n2−157m2n+39m2+4mn5−38mn4
+120mn3−167mn2+103mn−18m−2n5+11n4−21n3+18n2−7n
) ff,
(
2m4+11m3n−17m3+20m2n2−57m2n+44m2
+12mn3−48mn2+63mn−31m−6n2+13n−6
)
(
m4n−3m4+5m3n2−21m3n+22m3+8m2n3−47m2n2+85m2n
−53m2+4mn4−34mn3+88mn2−96mn+42m−2n4+7n3−5n2−n
) pf.
(SI.72)
As n grows, this critical ratio approaches (4m− 1) / (2m− 1) for pp-goods. For pf-goods and ff-goods,
this ratio is asymptotic to (6m/ (2m− 1)) /n as n→ ∞; in particular, it approaches 0. Therefore, for any
b, c > 0, there exists n such that producers are favored over non-producers.
Example 2 (Rich club). The “rich club” [36] is a structure consisting of a well-connected group of m
individuals, together with n individuals at the periphery. Each peripheral individual is connected to
all m members of the central rich club and nobody else. Every member of the rich club is connected
to all other individuals in the population. An example of such a structure is shown in Supplementary
Figure 3. A straightforward calculation shows that the unique solution to Equation SI.13 with τii = 0
for i = 1, . . . , N is
τij =

m3+4m2n−m2+4mn2−4mn−n2+2n−1
m2+3mn+n2−n i ∈ R, j ∈ P,
m3+4m2n+4mn2−mn+n−1
m2+3mn+n2−n i ∈ P, j ∈ P, i 6= j,
m(m2+4mn−m+4n2−4n)
m2+3mn+n2−n i ∈ R, j ∈ R, i 6= j,
0 i = j.
(SI.73)
Again, these quantities give all of the times τ by symmetry.
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By Equation 9, it follows that
(
b
c
)∗
=

(m2+3mn+n2−n)(m3+4m2n−3m2+4mn2−7mn+3m−n2+2n−1)
−m4−6m3n+2m3−11m2n2+9m2n−m2−5mn3+9mn2−4mn+n4−3n2+2n pp,
m(m+n−1)
(
m4+6m3n−2m3+12m2n2−10m2n+m2
+8mn3−12mn2+4mn−2n3+4n2−2n
)
(
−m5−6m4n+2m4−12m3n2+10m3n−m3−8m2n3
+12m2n2−4m2n+2mn3−4mn2+2mn+n5−2n4+2n2−n
) ff,
m4+6m3n−2m3+12m2n2−10m2n+m2+8mn3−12mn2+4mn−2n3+4n2−2n
−m4−6m3n+2m3−11m2n2+9m2n−m2−5mn3+9mn2−4mn+n4−3n2+2n pf.
(SI.74)
As n grows, this ratio approaches 4m− 1 for pp-goods. This ratio is asymptotic to (2m (4m− 1)) /n for
ff-goods and (2 (4m− 1)) /n for pf-goods.
SI.3.2 DB updating
Under DB updating, Equation SI.56 can be written in the form γb > βc, where β > 0. For each kind of
donation, there exist graphs for which γ > 0, meaning selection can favor A over B. Specifically, when
γ > 0,
ρA > ρB ⇐⇒ bc >
(
b
c
)∗
=

∑Ni,j,k=1 wij pjkwkτik
∑Ni,j,k,`=1 wij pjk(wk`−wi`)τi`
pp,
∑Ni,j,k=1 wij pjkτik
∑Ni,j,k,`=1 wij pjk(p`k−p`i)τi`
ff,
∑Ni,j,k=1 wij pjkτik
∑Ni,j,k,`=1 wij pjk(wk`−wi`)τi`
pf.
(SI.75)
For pp-goods on a d-regular graph, (b/c)∗ = d (N − 2) / (N − 2d) [22, 56], which therefore gives
(b/c)∗ for ff-goods as well. For pf-goods, (b/c)∗ = (N − 2) / (N − 2d). For all three kinds of donation,
it is clear that selection can favor producers over non-producers on a d-regular graph only if b > c.
However, we can find heterogeneous graphs on which producers are favored over non-producers even
when b < c.
Example 3 (Cluster of stars). By Equations SI.71 and SI.75, under DB updating we have
(
b
c
)∗
=

(
2m5+11m4n−21m4+21m3n2−80m3n+78m3
+16m2n3−93m2n2+186m2n−127m2+4mn4−34mn3
+114mn2−171mn+96m−4n4+26n3−70n2+82n−36
)
(m−1)
(
m3n−3m3+5m2n2−17m2n+18m2+8mn3
−34mn2+58mn−37m+4n4−22n3+52n2−62n+30
) pp,
(
2m3+6m2n−10m2+6mn2
−19mn+16m+2n3−9n2+14n−8
)( 2m4+11m3n−19m3+20m2n2
−65m2n+56m2+12mn3−58mn2
+92mn−53m−4n3+10n2−10n+6
)
(m−1)
(
2m2+4mn−6m
+2n2−5n+4
)( m4n−m4+6m3n2−16m3n+8m3+13m2n3
−55m2n2+75m2n−27m2+12mn4−70mn3+155mn2
−150mn+48m+4n5−30n4+92n3−144n2+116n−36
) ff,
(
2m4+11m3n−19m3+20m2n2−65m2n+56m2
+12mn3−58mn2+92mn−53m−4n3+10n2−10n+6
)
(m−1)
(
m3n−3m3+5m2n2−17m2n+18m2+8mn3
−34mn2+58mn−37m+4n4−22n3+52n2−62n+30
) pf.
(SI.76)
As n → ∞, this ratio approaches 1 under pp. For both pf-goods and ff-goods, this ratio is asymptotic
to ((3m− 1) / (m− 1)) /n as n → ∞. Thus, for any m > 1, there exists n for which this population
structure can support producers over non-producers even when 0 < b < c.
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Example 4 (Rich club). For the a rich club evolving according to DB updating,
(
b
c
)∗
=

(
−m5−7m4n+4m4−17m3n2+23m3n−5m3−16m2n3+40m2n2
−23m2n+2m2−4mn4+21mn3−29mn2+12mn+4n4−9n3+6n2−n
)
(m−1)(m+3n−2)(m2+3mn+n2−n) pp,
m(m+n−1)
(
−m4−6m3n+3m3−12m2n2+15m2n−2m2
−8mn3+19mn2−8mn+4n3−7n2+3n
)
(m−1)
(
m4+6m3n−2m3+11m2n2−8m2n
+5mn3−6mn2+mn−n4+n3+n2−n
) ff,
(
−m4−6m3n+3m3−12m2n2+15m2n−2m2
−8mn3+19mn2−8mn+4n3−7n2+3n
)
(m−1)(m+3n−2)(m2+3mn+n2−n) pf.
(SI.77)
For fixed m > 1, we therefore see that
lim
n→∞
(
b
c
)∗
=

−∞ pp,
4m(2m−1)
m−1 ff,
− 4(2m−1)3(m−1) pf.
(SI.78)
SI.3.3 On the necessity of b > c for pp-goods
When 0 < b 6 c, pp-goods have the property that no producer can have a payoff of more than 0.
Since every non-producer has a payoff of at least 0, it follows that every non-producer has at least the
payoff of the best-performing producer in the population. Informally speaking, when higher payoffs
result in more reproductive success, it should follow that producers of pp-goods cannot be favored over
non-producers when 0 < b 6 c. Here, we make this claim more formally.
Recall that the expected change RV-weighted abundance of A due to selection is
∆̂sel (x) =
N
∑
i,j=1
vi
(
xj − xi
)
eji (x)
=
N
∑
i,j=1
vi
(
(1− xi) xj − xi
(
1− xj
))
eji (x)
=
N
∑
i=1
vi
[
(1− xi)
N
∑
j=1
xjeji (x)− xi
N
∑
j=1
(
1− xj
)
eji (x)
]
. (SI.79)
The term ∑Nj=1 xjeji (x) is the probability that a producer replaces i, while ∑
N
j=1
(
1− xj
)
eji (x) is the
probability that a non-producer replaces i. When i is a non-producer the former should be reduced by
selection; when i is a producer, the latter should be increased by selection. This property, of course, is
not guaranteed to hold for any replacement rule, but it is reasonable to expect it to hold in models for
which higher payoffs result in greater competitive abilities.
For example, this property is easily seen to hold for PC, DB, and IM updating for pp-goods when
b 6 c. We do not include all of the details here, but it is straightforward to verify this claim using
Equations SI.46, SI.53, and SI.60. Since then ∆̂′sel (x) 6 0 for every x ∈ {0, 1}N , producers cannot be
favored over non-producers; such behavior would require b > c.
The same argument works for fp-goods as well. However, we have already seen numerous examples
of when selection favors producers of ff- and fp-goods even when 0 < b 6 c. The reason the argument
presented here does not apply to ff- and fp-goods is that there can still be states in which some producers
have higher payoffs than non-producers when 0 < b 6 c.
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SI.3.4 Monomorphic states and prosocial inequality
Let A and B denote the all-A and all-B states, respectively. As a simple example of what the monomor-
phic states look like in a heterogeneous population, consider the star graph (Supplementary Figure 11
with m = 1). For all three kinds of donation, uhub (B) = uleaf (B) = 0. We look at the other monomor-
phic state, A, separately:
For pp-goods, we have uhub (A) = (N − 1) (b− c) and uleaf (A) = b− c, which gives
u (A) = 2
(
1− 1
N
)
(b− c) ; (SI.80a)
uhub (A)− uleaf (A) = (N − 2) (b− c) ; (SI.80b)
max {uhub (A) , uleaf (A)} =
{
(N − 1) (b− c) b > c,
b− c b < c; (SI.80c)
min {uhub (A) , uleaf (A)} =
{
b− c b > c,
(N − 1) (b− c) b < c. (SI.80d)
For ff-goods, uhub (A) = (N − 1) b− c and uleaf (A) = b/ (N − 1)− c, giving
u (A) = b− c; (SI.81a)
uhub (A)− uleaf (A) = N (N − 2)N − 1 b; (SI.81b)
max {uhub (A) , uleaf (A)} = (N − 1) b− c; (SI.81c)
min {uhub (A) , uleaf (A)} = 1N − 1 b− c. (SI.81d)
Finally, for pf-goods, uhub (A) = (N − 1) b− c and uleaf (A) = b− c, so we have
u (A) = 2
(
1− 1
N
)
b− c; (SI.82a)
uhub (A)− uleaf (A) = (N − 2) b; (SI.82b)
max {uhub (A) , uleaf (A)} = (N − 1) b− c; (SI.82c)
min {uhub (A) , uleaf (A)} = b− c. (SI.82d)
Thus, in the case of pf-goods, if c/2 < b < c and N is sufficiently large, then producers are favored and
u (A) > 0.
SI.3.5 Accumulated versus averaged payoffs
For each kind of social good considered thus far, we have used accumulation to determine overall
payoff in a population. An alternative method, which is popular for pp-goods [19, 28, 57–61], involves
averaging these payoffs instead of adding them. In other words, if, under accumulated payoffs, Bij is
the benefit to i due to the donation of j and Cij is the corresponding cost, then, under averaged payoffs,
these terms undergo the transformation
B′ij =
Bij
wi
; (SI.83a)
C′ij =
Cij
wi
. (SI.83b)
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Using averaged payoffs, we obtain ρ′A > ρ
′
B under PC updating if and only if γb > βc, where
γ ; β =

−∑Ni=1 wi ; ∑Ni,j=1 wijτji pp,
∑Ni,j,k=1 wij
( pkj
wj
− pkiwi
)
τki ; ∑
N
i,j=1 pjiτji ff,
−∑Ni=1 wi ; ∑Ni,j=1 pjiτji pf.
(SI.84)
For both pp-goods and pf-goods with payoff averaging, we have γ < 0, which means that producers
can never be favored over non-producers in the limit of weak selection. In contrast, for ff-goods with
averaging, there do exist structures on which γ > 0. For example, on the star of size N, we have
(b/c)∗ =
(
3N2 − 4N) / (N2 − 8N + 8), which converges to 3 as N → ∞. Coincidentally, this ratio is the
same as that of pp-goods with accumulated payoffs on the star (c.f. Equation SI.72). In general, however,
the conditions for ρA > ρB are distinct in these two cases (pp-goods with accumulation and ff-goods
with averaging).
SI.3.6 Additional contribution to a public pool
Consider ff-goods on a star. Suppose that for some θ ∈ [0, 1], each producer contributes (1− θ) b to
their neighborhood and θb to a common pool. The overall cost is c, and the common pool gets divided
among all members of the population. This scenario is depicted in Supplementary Figure 14. If θ is
the contribution rate to the common pool, then, under PC updating, selection favors producers over
non-producers on a star of size N when
b
c
>
(
b
c
)∗
θ
:=
1
1− θ
6N2 − 14N + 8
N3 − 6N2 + 6N . (SI.85)
In the all-non-producer state, everyone has a payoff of 0. In the all-producer state, the payoff to the hub
is (N − 1) (1− θ) b− c + θb and the payoff each leaf is (1− θ) b/ (N − 1)− c + θb. The payoff to each
leaf individual is at least zero if and only if b > c and
θ > θ∗ = (N − 1) c− b
b (N − 2) . (SI.86)
Note that 0 < θ∗ < 1 if and only if c < b < (N − 1) c.
For example, suppose that b = 2 and c = 1. Then,
θ∗ = N − 3
2 (N − 2) , (SI.87)
which approaches c/b = 1/2 as N → ∞. At this contribution level, the hub gets N and the leaves all
get 0 in the all-producer state. Therefore, everyone is at least as well off as in the all-non-producer state,
and moreover producers can evolve whenever N is not too small, since
b
c
= 2 >
(
b
c
)∗
= 2
6N2 − 14N + 8
N3 − 6N2 + 6N 
12
N
. (SI.88)
Note that for pp-goods without contribution to a common pool, we require b/c > 3 on the star.
SI.4 Relationship to prior literature
Broadly speaking, our contribution is twofold: (i) a general theory of the evolutionary success of pro-
ducers and (ii) applications of this theory that uncover surprising results about producers of prosocial
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goods. Our framework and results are general in two distinct ways. First, each type (A and B) can be
producers of arbitrary social goods. If i has type A, then he or she provides Bij to j at a cost of Cij.
If i has type B, then he or she gives bij to j at a cost of cij. Second, we do not assume that evolution
proceeds according to a specific update rule (e.g. PC, DB, or IM). We treat specific update rules in the
examples, but our conditions for evolutionary success hold in a much more general context, namely for
distributions over replacement events,
{
p(R,α) (x)
}
(R,α)
.
Here we review prior related literature for evolutionary games in structured populations, and high-
light how work relates to these previous results.
SI.4.1 Pairwise games in structured populations
There is an extensive literature on 2× 2 matrix games in graph-structured populations [10, 20, 21, 23,
24, 26, 28, 57, 62–64]. Such a matrix game can be written in general form as
( A B
A R S
B T P
)
, (SI.89)
For T > R > P > S, this game is a Prisoner’s Dilemma, with strategy A representing cooperation. When
a player has many neighbors, as is the case in graph-structured populations, a total payoff is obtained
by either accumulating or averaging the payoffs from many pairwise interactions. This kind of model
corresponds to our notion of pp-goods (see also §SI.3.5).
A specific instance of the prisoner’s dilemma known as the donation game is often used since it
provides a simple description of an altruistic act: a cooperator (A) pays a cost of c to donate b to
the opponent; defectors (B) pay no costs and provide no donations. In terms of Equation SI.89, the
donation game satisfies R = b− c, S = −c, T = b, and P = 0. This donation game is typically easier to
analyze than the general matrix game Equation SI.89. However, once conditions for ρA > ρB have been
obtained for the donation game, these conditions can be generalized to an arbitrary game of the form
Equation SI.89 by means of the Structure Coefficient Theorem [63, 64].
Whereas these studies focus on pairwise interactions described by a fixed matrix game, we consider
dilemmas of social goods, in which the goods produced by an individual are distributed to its neighbors
in a manner which depends on the population structure. If i and j are neighbors, then, instead of their
interaction being described by a symmetric payoff matrix
( A B
A b− c, b− c −c, b
B b, −c 0, 0
)
, (SI.90)
in a social goods dilemma it is described by an asymmetric payoff matrix,
Mij =
( A B
A Bji − Cij, Bij − Cji −Cij, Bij
B Bji, −Cji 0, 0
)
. (SI.91)
In other words, type A (producer) at location i pays Cij to donate Bij to j. Type B (non-producer) at this
same location pays nothing and gives nothing. Our theory applies to more general bimatrix games [65–
68], although we are particularly focused on asymmetric games arising from the production of social
goods.
Below, we give a brief summary of work on symmetric games in structured populations.
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SI.4.1.1 Regular and homogeneous graphs
A regular graph is one in which all individuals share the same number of neighbors, i.e. wi = d for
every i = 1, . . . , N and some fixed d. Using the pair-approximation method on regular graphs, Ohtsuki
et al. [21] showed that weak selection favors the evolution of cooperation if b/c > d. Moreover, the
difference between accumulated and averaged payoffs on a regular graph amounts to a simple rescaling
of both b and c, so this critical threshold, namely (b/c)∗ = d, is the same for both methods of obtaining a
net payoff from many interactions. This result has also been refined to capture finite-population effects
on weighted vertex-transitive graphs [23, 35, 69] and unweighted regular graphs [22].
SI.4.1.2 Heterogeneous graphs
Although there are many simulation-based investigations of pairwise games on heterogeneous graphs
(e.g. 6, 19, 24, 26, 57), an analytic solution for weak selection was not found until Allen et al. [28].
Conditions for a strategy to be favored under weak selection were found for DB and BD updating, using
either averaged or accumulated payoffs, in terms of coalescence times. The properties of this solution
were further explored in follow-up works by Fotouhi et al. [36, 70].
The results of Allen et al. [28], in the case of the donation game with averaged payoffs, can be
recovered from our results, by setting Cij = cwij/wi and Bij = bwij/wi for each i and j. Equation SI.13 is
equivalent, under DB or BD updating, to the systems of equations for coalescence times that Allen et al.
[28] used.
SI.4.2 Public goods games in structured populations
Numerous works [15, 17, 71–74] have considered public goods games on graphs. In additional to
classical public goods, one may also consider public goods that travel through the network by diffusion.
This framework can be used to model the production of diffusible chemical goods in microbes [75–77].
Conditions for the production of such goods on weighted vertex-transitive graphs were obtained by
Allen et al. [78].
Since our focus is on social goods donated to immediate neighbors with no self-donation, we do not
give a complete analysis of public goods games. However, there is one study of public goods games,
carried out by Santos et al. [15], that is particularly relevant to our model since it involves a numerical
comparison of fixed- and proportional-cost goods in multiplayer interactions.
Santos et al. [15] consider a model of public goods games in heterogeneous populations in which
every individual is involved in multiple games. Each individual initiates an interaction with neighbors,
and everyone involved benefits from the public good involved in this interaction. An individual with
k neighbors therefore participates in k + 1 interactions, one initiated by themselves and k initiated by
neighbors. In their model, a cooperator contributes either c per game or c in total (i.e. c/ (k + 1) per
game); non-producers do nothing. The total contribution is then multiplied by an enhancement factor,
r, and divided among all individuals involved in the game.
If χi denotes the per-game contribution when i cooperates, this model satisfies
Bij =
N
∑
k=1
w′ikw
′
kj
(
r
χi
w′k
)
; (SI.92a)
Cij =
N
∑
k=1
w′ikw
′
kj
(
χi
w′k
)
, (SI.92b)
where, again, w′ii = 1 for i = 1, . . . , N and w
′
ij = wij if i 6= j. Therefore, this model can be seen as a
special case of ours.
For both PC and DB updating, let τii = 0 for i = 1, . . . , N and τij = 1 + (1/2)∑Nk=1 pikτkj +
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(1/2)∑Nk=1 pjkτik for i 6= j. Under PC updating, for example, we have
ρ′A > ρ
′
B ⇐⇒ r
N
∑
i,j=1
wi pij
N
∑
`=1
xi`
(
C`i − C`j
)
>
N
∑
i,j=1
wi pij
N
∑
`=1
(
xiiCi` − xijCj`
)
⇐⇒ r
N
∑
i,j=1
wi pij
N
∑
`=1
τi`
(
C`j − C`i
)
>
N
∑
i,j=1
wi pij
N
∑
`=1
τijCj`. (SI.93)
Under DB updating,
ρ′A > ρ
′
B ⇐⇒ r
N
∑
i,j=1
wi p
(2)
ij
N
∑
`=1
xi`
(
C`i − C`j
)
>
N
∑
i,j=1
wi p
(2)
ij
N
∑
`=1
(
xiiCi` − xijCj`
)
⇐⇒ r
N
∑
i,j=1
wi p
(2)
ij
N
∑
`=1
τi`
(
C`j − C`i
)
>
N
∑
i,j=1
wi p
(2)
ij
N
∑
`=1
τijCj`. (SI.94)
Finally, we note that there is nearly always wealth inequality in heterogeneous populations, even for
pp-goods with accumulated payoffs. Santos et al. [15] observe that the nature of how players participate
in public goods games in heterogeneous populations can amplify inequality. Our notion of “prosocial
inequality” is somewhat different, however. Whereas inequality can be present even when selection
improves the payoffs of all players in the population, we show that selection can actually decrease the
payoff of some while improving the payoff of others. Thus, prosocial inequality is not a measure of
relative inequality within the all-A state; it is a measure of inequality in the all-A state as compared to
the all-B state.
SI.4.3 Deterministic versus stochastic payoffs
One final way in which our model and results differ from those of prior studies is that we allow for
stochastic payoffs in addition to deterministic payoffs. In fact, we show in §SI.1.5 that a model with
stochastic payoffs can be replaced by one with deterministic payoffs under weak selection. This result is
particularly relevant for goods with concentrated, stochastic benefits (Supplementary Figure 6), where
the critical threshold for producers to evolve is identical to that of ff-goods.
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population size, 𝑵 total number of graphs of size 𝑵 number of graphs that can support producers over non-producers (𝜸 > 𝟎)
pp, pf ff, fp2 1 0 03 2 0 04 6 0 05 21 0 16 112 0 57 853 1 448 11,117 5 4769 261,080 25 7,05510 11,716,571 179 168,600
Table SI.1: Number of small graphs that can support producers over non-producers under PC updating.
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